Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
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Publication:1389240
DOI10.1007/s001990050204zbMath0903.90005OpenAlexW2132005351MaRDI QIDQ1389240
Publication date: 5 January 1999
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050204
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