Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
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Recommendations
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
Cites work
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- On cores and indivisibility
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Voting by Committees
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(49)- Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Choice in ordered-tree-based decision problems
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- Solving house allocation problems with risk-averse agents
- Consistent house allocation
- Efficient priority rules
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
- House allocation with fractional endowments
- House allocation with transfers
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
- Robust equilibria in tournaments
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
- Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions
- Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
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