Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
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Publication:1079463
DOI10.1007/BF00649265zbMath0597.90011MaRDI QIDQ1079463
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (83)
Possible winner problems on partial tournaments: a parameterized study ⋮ A theorem of voting rules and budget deficits ⋮ Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives ⋮ Choosing from a tournament ⋮ Weak covering relations ⋮ Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees ⋮ The Copeland measure of Condorcet choice functions ⋮ On the difficulty of making social choices ⋮ A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments ⋮ Simple games with many effective voters ⋮ Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting ⋮ The uncovered set in spatial voting games ⋮ Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting ⋮ Black and Farquharson on order-of-voting effects: An extension ⋮ Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes ⋮ A note on extended stable sets ⋮ A survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments ⋮ Endogenous voting agendas ⋮ The Banks set in infinite spaces ⋮ Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence ⋮ Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule ⋮ On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures ⋮ Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules ⋮ Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison ⋮ Minimal extending sets in tournaments ⋮ A 16-vertex tournament for which Banks set and Slater set are disjoint ⋮ Column-Wise Extendible Vector Expressions and the Relational Computation of Sets of Sets ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ Computing and visualizing Banks sets of dominance relations using relation algebra and RelView ⋮ Improved bounds for minimal feedback vertex sets in tournaments ⋮ Rational stability of choice functions ⋮ Individual choice under social influence ⋮ Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise ⋮ A \(7 / 3\)-approximation algorithm for feedback vertex set in tournaments via Sherali-Adams ⋮ Tight bounds on 3-team manipulations in randomized death match ⋮ Maximum distance between Slater orders and Copeland orders of tournaments ⋮ Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications ⋮ Minimal stable sets in tournaments ⋮ Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000) ⋮ Feedback Vertex Sets in Tournaments ⋮ Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution ⋮ Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections ⋮ Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members ⋮ Representation in majority tournaments ⋮ The minimal covering set in large tournaments ⋮ FUZZY SETS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: AN OVERVIEW ⋮ A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz ⋮ Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure ⋮ Uncovered sets ⋮ In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games ⋮ A note on contestation-based tournament solutions ⋮ On fuzzy tournaments and their solution concepts in group decision making ⋮ A foundation for strategic agenda voting ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ Computing the minimal covering set ⋮ Rank-based choice correspondences ⋮ Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect ⋮ A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ How hard is it to control an election? ⋮ A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set ⋮ A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets ⋮ Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction ⋮ Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile ⋮ A social choice theory of legitimacy ⋮ A tournament of order 14 with disjoint Banks and Slater sets ⋮ An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments ⋮ A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions ⋮ A new perspective on implementation by voting trees ⋮ The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas ⋮ Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency ⋮ On the tournament equilibrium set ⋮ Choosing from a large tournament ⋮ The Basic Approval Voting Game ⋮ The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems ⋮ A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions ⋮ On the complexity of Slater's problems ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy ⋮ Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions ⋮ Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
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