Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
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Publication:3346116
DOI10.2307/1911196zbMath0552.90098OpenAlexW2162593497MaRDI QIDQ3346116
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911196
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