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Publication:3323629
zbMATH Open0537.90001MaRDI QIDQ3323629FDOQ3323629
Peter Fishburn, Steven J. Brams
Publication date: 1983
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
fairnesssimulationplurality votingstrategy-proofnessapproval votingpollingrunoffempirical examplesmulticandidate electionconstitutional law
History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules
- Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
- Approval Voting in Large Electorates
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Characterizing approval voting
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- A live experiment on approval voting
- Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules
- The median rule in judgement aggregation
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- Majority judgment vs. majority rule
- Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements
- Strategic voting and nomination
- Coalition voting
- Manipulability of choice aggregations
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Committee selection under weight constraints
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
- Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
- Handbook on approval voting
- Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
- On the existence of a minimum integer representation for weighted voting systems
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Weight voting systems and the method of multirelations
- Bargaining through approval
- Some remarks on the concept of proportionality
- Logic based merging
- A participatory budget model under uncertainty
- The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited
- A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
- How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?
- On measures of cohesiveness under dichotomous opinions: some characterizations of approval consensus measures
- An approval-voting polytope for linear orders
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Approval elections with a variable number of winners
- Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- Making statements and approval voting
- Consensus reaching in committees
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences
- Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
- Approval voting: three examples
- Decision framing in judgment aggregation
- Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- Weighted approval voting
- Voting Procedures, Complexity of
- Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
- Rank-based modelling of preferences in multi-criteria decision making
- The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
- Binary choice, subset choice, random utility, and ranking: a unified perspective using the permutahedron
- Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- Evaluating competing theories via a common language of qualitative verdicts
- Approval voting in subset elections
- Variable-population voting rules
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
- A general scoring rule
- On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
- Approaches to collective decision making with fuzzy preference relations
- Social Choice Theory
- Reduction in problem size for ranking alternatives in group decision- making
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- Probabilistic preferences and topset voting
- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- The mathematical psychology of Peter Fishburn
- Why does voting get so complicated? A review of theories for analyzing democratic participation
- Signed orders and power set extensions
- Recognition of relations by the method of collective vote
- Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting
- Focusing on Campaigns
- Balancedness of social choice correspondences
- Aggregating Imprecise Linguistic Expressions
- Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
- Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
- Statement voting
- Approval Voting in Product Societies
- Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
- Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
- Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)
- Peter C. Fishburn (1936--2021)
- Conformity in voting
- Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting
- Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
- Stochastic precedence and minima among dependent variables
- VMAVA+: (VOTING METHOD BASED ON APPROVAL VOTING AND ARITHMETIC MEAN)+
- Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Knapsack cost sharing
Recommendations
- Title not available (Why is that?) π π
- Title not available (Why is that?) π π
- Approval voting reconsidered π π
- Approval voting in subset elections π π
- Approval Voting in Large Electorates π π
- A simple characterization of approval voting π π
- Characterizing approval voting π π
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences π π
- Weighted approval voting π π
- Approval voting without ballot restrictions π π
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