The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.008zbMath1181.91041OpenAlexW2082276583MaRDI QIDQ707290

D. Kharzeev

Publication date: 9 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

communicationinformationcheap talkexperts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (49)

Strategic gradual learning and information transmission ⋮ Dynamic persuasion ⋮ A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Goodwill in communication ⋮ Comparative cheap talk ⋮ Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control ⋮ Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers ⋮ Dynamic strategic information transmission ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games ⋮ Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult ⋮ Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences ⋮ Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games ⋮ Mediated talk: an experiment ⋮ Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests ⋮ Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games ⋮ A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games ⋮ Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information ⋮ Intentional vagueness ⋮ Communication in bargaining over decision rights ⋮ RANDOM AUTHORITY ⋮ Communication under language barriers ⋮ Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk ⋮ Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication ⋮ Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns ⋮ Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response ⋮ Long persuasion games ⋮ How to talk to multiple audiences ⋮ Informational control and organizational design ⋮ Communication via a strategic mediator ⋮ Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case ⋮ Mediation, arbitration and negotiation ⋮ MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Designing communication hierarchies ⋮ Cheap talk with private signal structures ⋮ Incomplete contracts versus communication ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types ⋮ Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders ⋮ An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk ⋮ Confidence and competence in communication ⋮ Competitive cheap talk

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• A Model of Expertise
• Universal Mechanisms
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Long Cheap Talk
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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