Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1125572
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2555zbMath0972.91020OpenAlexW2167649812MaRDI QIDQ1125572
Marciano Siniscalchi, Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publication date: 6 December 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/674
Related Items (73)
An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma ⋮ AGENT CONNECTEDNESS AND BACKWARD INDUCTION ⋮ Dynamic interactive epistemology ⋮ From self-regarding to other-regarding agents in strategic games: a logical analysis ⋮ On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information ⋮ When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs? ⋮ Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure ⋮ Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games ⋮ Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games ⋮ Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets ⋮ An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games ⋮ Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games ⋮ Weak belief and permissibility ⋮ An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ An infinitary probability logic for type spaces ⋮ The predictive role of counterfactuals ⋮ An epistemic approach to stochastic games ⋮ The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces ⋮ Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium ⋮ The logic of backward induction ⋮ A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games ⋮ Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games ⋮ Complete Conditional Type Structures (Extended Abstract) ⋮ PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES ⋮ Universal type structures with unawareness ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability ⋮ Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction ⋮ Opportunistic conformism ⋮ Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs ⋮ Conditional belief types ⋮ Intrinsic correlation in games ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ Equivalence of the information structure with unawareness to the logic of awareness ⋮ Universal knowledge-belief structures ⋮ Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models ⋮ Finitely additive beliefs and universal type spaces ⋮ Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies ⋮ Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games ⋮ When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? ⋮ Community-based reasoning in games: salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals ⋮ Economic harmony: an epistemic theory of economic interactions ⋮ Universal interactive preferences ⋮ Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality ⋮ Dynamic psychological games ⋮ Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games ⋮ Conditional Probability Logic over Conditional Probability Spaces ⋮ Hypothetical revision and matter-of-fact supposition ⋮ RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS ⋮ Mutually acceptable courses of action ⋮ Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox ⋮ Common theories ⋮ Informational robustness of common belief in rationality ⋮ Logical Player Types for a Theory of Play ⋮ Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk ⋮ Strong forward induction ⋮ Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning ⋮ Consistent beliefs in extensive form games ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners ⋮ Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity ⋮ Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Topology-free typology of beliefs
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
- Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
- A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Coherent beliefs are not always types.
- Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
- On a new axiomatic theory of probability
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Real Analysis and Probability
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
This page was built for publication: Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
