A Model of Expertise
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Publication:2752455
DOI10.1162/00335530151144159zbMath1017.91015OpenAlexW2005194216MaRDI QIDQ2752455
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Publication date: 16 October 2001
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/cbb69025dbf4bd0befd0e1c7f00782505a517086
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