Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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Publication:5608606
DOI10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159zbMath0207.51102OpenAlexW4250744658WikidataQ55953131 ScholiaQ55953131MaRDI QIDQ5608606
Publication date: 1967
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159
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