School choice: an experimental study
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Cites work
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Cited in
(81)- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study
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- Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice
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- Corrigendum to ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]
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- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
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