Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
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- Equivalences between two matching models: stability
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7278072 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the approximability of the stable matching problem with ties of size two
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