Social Norms and Community Enforcement

DOI10.2307/2297925zbMath0763.90109OpenAlexW2056700716WikidataQ48913525 ScholiaQ48913525MaRDI QIDQ3988997

Michihiro Kandori

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Unnamed Author (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f98e69f9cefeb8eb7998ea5fcad3ea211018b39d

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescooperationself-enforcing agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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