Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
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Publication:645640
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.03.003zbMath1274.91066OpenAlexW2162729609MaRDI QIDQ645640
Antonio Cabrales, Roberto Serrano
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/12895
Related Items (21)
Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case ⋮ When ``better is better than ``best ⋮ Price suppression stimulation in a local market ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization ⋮ Behavioral strong implementation ⋮ Behavioral implementation under incomplete information ⋮ Complexity and repeated implementation ⋮ Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences ⋮ Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments ⋮ Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities ⋮ Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ Rationalizable implementation ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
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