Participation constraints in adverse selection models

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2641zbMath0970.91036OpenAlexW2095109474MaRDI QIDQ1584552

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2641

zbMATH Keywords

uncertainty adverse selection agency contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (78)

Contractual distortions in a market with frictions ⋮ Identification of participation constraints in contracts ⋮ Optimal bunching without optimal control ⋮ Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present ⋮ Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information ⋮ An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies ⋮ Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case ⋮ Asymmetric information in a bilateral monopoly ⋮ Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint ⋮ Implementation of competitive nonlinear pricing: tariffs with inclusive consumption ⋮ Method of digraphs for multi-dimensional screening ⋮ Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities ⋮ Coordination and externalities ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions ⋮ A model of product line design and introduction sequence with reservation utility ⋮ Optimal pricing for selling a congestible good with countervailing incentives ⋮ Informed principal and countervailing incentives ⋮ Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO ⋮ Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models ⋮ Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information ⋮ Partial ownership and cross-border mergers ⋮ An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values ⋮ Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation ⋮ Mechanism design with informational punishment ⋮ Insurance contracts and financial markets ⋮ Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions ⋮ Bargaining over incentive contracts ⋮ Consulting collusive experts ⋮ Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines ⋮ Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information ⋮ Dynamic screening with limited commitment ⋮ Information acquisition and countervailing incentives ⋮ Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Investments as signals of outside options ⋮ Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information ⋮ Dynamic Selling Mechanisms for Product Differentiation and Learning ⋮ On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening ⋮ Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation ⋮ Pre-sale information ⋮ Ironing without control ⋮ Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective ⋮ Sharing Profits in the Sharing Economy ⋮ Trading under market impact: crossing networks interacting with dealer markets ⋮ Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets ⋮ Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information ⋮ OPTIMAL REINSURANCE DESIGN WITH DISTORTION RISK MEASURES AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ⋮ Non‐smooth monotonicity constraints in optimal control problems: Some economic applications ⋮ Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules ⋮ Pricing decision of a manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric information ⋮ Optimal taxation in the extensive model ⋮ Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information ⋮ Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition ⋮ Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values ⋮ An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance ⋮ The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships ⋮ Contract design and bargaining power ⋮ Supply chain structure and demand risk ⋮ Participation in moral hazard problems ⋮ Mechanism design with collusive supervision ⋮ Managerial compensation and research and development investment in a two-period agency setting ⋮ Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory ⋮ The role of optimal threats in auction design ⋮ Optimal sales mechanism with outside options ⋮ A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples ⋮ An Adverse Selection Approach to Power Pricing ⋮ Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation ⋮ A model of secular migration from centralized to decentralized trade ⋮ Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions ⋮ Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search ⋮ Participation constraints in adverse selection models ⋮ Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types ⋮ On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information ⋮ Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory ⋮ Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs

Cites Work

This page was built for publication: Participation constraints in adverse selection models