Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
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Publication:4949573
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00119zbMath0956.91027OpenAlexW2095803264MaRDI QIDQ4949573
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00119
Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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