A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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Publication:5183309

DOI10.2307/2296617zbMath0274.90072OpenAlexW1979505449WikidataQ29398616 ScholiaQ29398616MaRDI QIDQ5183309

James W. Friedman

Publication date: 1971

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296617




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