Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
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Publication:3468907
DOI10.2307/1913771zbMath0693.90105OpenAlexW2163189802MaRDI QIDQ3468907
David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64081
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