Strategy-Proof Exchange
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Publication:4833988
DOI10.2307/2951697zbMath0834.90007OpenAlexW2052712170MaRDI QIDQ4833988
Matthew O. Jackson, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 1 April 1996
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951697
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