Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00317zbMath1121.91342OpenAlexW3123904525MaRDI QIDQ5474986

Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d12/d1248.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (70)

Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline ⋮ Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract ⋮ Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions ⋮ Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights ⋮ Optimal search auctions ⋮ The value of information for auctioneers ⋮ On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation ⋮ Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning ⋮ Information order in monotone decision problems under uncertainty ⋮ Information concentration in common value environments ⋮ Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types ⋮ VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities ⋮ Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition ⋮ On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions ⋮ The limits of ex post implementation without transfers ⋮ Unrestricted information acquisition ⋮ When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability ⋮ Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning ⋮ Efficient assignment with interdependent values ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly ⋮ Information acquisition in committees ⋮ Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence ⋮ Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions ⋮ Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Markets for information: of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies ⋮ What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach ⋮ Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. ⋮ Information acquisition during a Dutch auction ⋮ Information acquisition during a descending auction ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous information ⋮ Implementation in an interdependent value framework ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ MONOPOLY INSURANCE AND ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property ⋮ Strategic disaggregation in matching markets ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Information structures in optimal auctions ⋮ Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials ⋮ Communication of preferences in contests for contracts ⋮ Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents ⋮ Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs ⋮ On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle ⋮ Merger negotiations and ex-post regret ⋮ Endogenous information and stochastic contracts ⋮ Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition ⋮ Ex-ante versus ex-post destination information model for on-demand service ride-sharing platform ⋮ Auctions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Contracts with endogenous information ⋮ Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry ⋮ Optimal auctions with information acquisition ⋮ Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models ⋮ Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition ⋮ Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs ⋮ Index-wise comparative statics ⋮ When does centralization undermine adaptation? ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering

This page was built for publication: Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design