Algorithmic mechanism design

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0790zbMath0996.68251WikidataQ55899415 ScholiaQ55899415MaRDI QIDQ5938624

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.16.7473

zbMATH Keywords

scheduling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

68M14: Distributed systems

68W25: Approximation algorithms

68W15: Distributed algorithms

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