Dynamic psychological games
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Publication:1001812
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.004zbMath1155.91323OpenAlexW3123842769MaRDI QIDQ1001812
Martin Dufwenberg, Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publication date: 19 February 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:287
psychological gamesbelief-dependent motivationdynamic interactive epistemologyextensive-form solution concepts
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