Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
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Publication:1156089
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1zbMath0467.90084OpenAlexW1994752643WikidataQ56482321 ScholiaQ56482321MaRDI QIDQ1156089
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1
predatory pricingchain-store paradoxdecision-analytic approachgames of perfect informationNash- equilibrium approachpredatory-pricing monopolist
Decision theory (91B06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
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