Multistage Games with Communication
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Publication:3735519
DOI10.2307/1913154zbMath0599.90134OpenAlexW2059191774MaRDI QIDQ3735519
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/590.pdf
multistage gamescommunication equilibriumcommunication mechanismscentral mediatorCodominated actions
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