Sequential Equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3942768
DOI10.2307/1912767zbMath0483.90092OpenAlexW4248083116MaRDI QIDQ3942768
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912767
optimal strategytopological structureequilibrium pathinformation setsequential equilibriumperfect equilibriumequilibria of extensive gamesSelten's trembling-hand perfect equilibriasequentially rational strategies
Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)
The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities ⋮ The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint ⋮ Inefficient stage Nash is not stable ⋮ Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information ⋮ Strategic behavior in dynamic auctions ⋮ Local perfection ⋮ Common knowledge with probability 1 ⋮ Anonymous sequential games ⋮ Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem ⋮ Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem ⋮ Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games ⋮ Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation ⋮ On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval ⋮ Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall ⋮ Perfect equilibrium points and lexicographic domination ⋮ Strategic irrationality in extensive games ⋮ On the robustness of equilibrium refinements ⋮ Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees ⋮ An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria ⋮ Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games ⋮ Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games ⋮ Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information ⋮ Persuasion and receiver's news ⋮ Refinements of Nash equilibrium: A critique ⋮ Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans ⋮ Rationality and bounded rationality ⋮ Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games ⋮ Stable equilibria and forward induction ⋮ Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory ⋮ A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games ⋮ Preselection and expert advice ⋮ Some further results on the stability of Ky Fan's points ⋮ Upper and lower conditional probabilities induced by a multivalued mapping ⋮ Coalitions among computationally bounded agents ⋮ Modeling agents as qualitative decision makers ⋮ Strongly essential set of Ky Fan's points and the stability of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions ⋮ Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning. ⋮ Equilibrium selection in multi-leader-follower games with vertical information ⋮ Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty. ⋮ Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Reputation and imperfect information ⋮ Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information. ⋮ Weak isomorphism of extensive games. ⋮ Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games ⋮ Models for pessimistic or optimistic decisions under different uncertain scenarios ⋮ Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society ⋮ An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information ⋮ Lexicographic domination in extensive games ⋮ Approximation of contractible valued correspondences by functions ⋮ Multitrade bargaining ⋮ On equilibria in games with imperfect recall ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible ⋮ Economic implications of imperfect quality certification ⋮ The strength of a little perfection ⋮ Equilibrium refinement in psychological games ⋮ Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory ⋮ Equilibrium exit in stochastically declining industries ⋮ Psychological games and sequential rationality ⋮ A note on equalization in extensive form games ⋮ Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing ⋮ Viscous population equilibria ⋮ Backward induction and beliefs about oneself ⋮ Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon ⋮ Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information ⋮ On self-enforcement in extensive-form games ⋮ The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria ⋮ State-independent subjective expected lexicographic utility ⋮ Player importance and forward induction ⋮ Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs ⋮ Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information ⋮ Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating ⋮ Rational beliefs in extensive games ⋮ Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants ⋮ Bayesian updating rules and AGM belief revision ⋮ Sequential fair Stackelberg equilibria of linear strategies in risk-seeking insider trading ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network ⋮ Patrolling security games: definition and algorithms for solving large instances with single patroller and single intruder ⋮ Herding with collective preferences ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game ⋮ Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information ⋮ Commitment and observability in games ⋮ The space of conditional systems is a ball ⋮ Limit consistent solutions in noncooperative games ⋮ Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games ⋮ Delegation and the regulation of risk ⋮ Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games ⋮ Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation ⋮ Perfect sequential equilibrium ⋮ Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information ⋮ Credible debate equilibria ⋮ Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games ⋮ On non-Nash equilibria ⋮ Bargaining on behalf of a constituency ⋮ Privately observed time horizons in repeated games ⋮ Multiagent negotiation under time constraints ⋮ A duopoly model of pricing for inventory liquidation ⋮ Endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay. ⋮ A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
This page was built for publication: Sequential Equilibria
