Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4740292
DOI10.2307/2296962zbMath0504.90003OpenAlexW1974895756MaRDI QIDQ4740292
Kim C. Border, James S. Jordan
Publication date: 1983
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171005-161613179
manipulabilitydictatorshipnon-manipulable direct revelation social choice functionsone- dimensional mechanismsseparable star-shaped preferenceuncompromising choice functionsweak unanimity
Related Items (81)
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization ⋮ On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties ⋮ Stimulation and decision-making in the active system theory. Review of problems and new results ⋮ Voting under constraints ⋮ Locating a public good on a sphere ⋮ Strategy-proofness and ``median voters ⋮ Immunity to credible deviations from the truth ⋮ Use of intersection property for analysis of feasibility of multicriteria expertise results ⋮ Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise ⋮ On strategy-proof direct mechanism of active expertise over strictly convex compact set ⋮ Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains ⋮ Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices ⋮ The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains ⋮ Spatial implementation ⋮ A characterization of the single-peaked domain ⋮ Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains ⋮ Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains ⋮ The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules ⋮ Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions ⋮ New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness ⋮ On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies ⋮ Sincere voting in models of legislative elections ⋮ Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness ⋮ Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting ⋮ On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness ⋮ The capacity constrained facility location problem ⋮ Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? ⋮ Incentive compatible regression learning ⋮ On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness ⋮ Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good ⋮ Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains ⋮ ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good ⋮ Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research ⋮ Representative Committees of Peers ⋮ Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods ⋮ Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems ⋮ Strategy-proof location of public facilities ⋮ Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof location on a network ⋮ Voting by committees under constraints ⋮ On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness ⋮ John A. Weymark ⋮ Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences ⋮ Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences ⋮ Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences ⋮ On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals ⋮ Truthful aggregation of budget proposals ⋮ The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces ⋮ Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability ⋮ Parameterization of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in the Obnoxious Facility Game ⋮ Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences ⋮ The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm ⋮ Voting on multiple issues: What to put on the ballot? ⋮ Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges ⋮ Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals ⋮ Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs ⋮ Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle ⋮ Matching with partners and projects ⋮ Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences ⋮ Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms ⋮ Nonmanipulability in two dimensions ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions ⋮ Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods. ⋮ Condorcet winners for public goods
This page was built for publication: Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
