Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3346115
DOI10.2307/1911197zbMath0552.90097OpenAlexW2143284884MaRDI QIDQ3346115
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911197
Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)
A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection ⋮ A Semantical Approach to Equilibria and Rationality ⋮ Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ On the implications of integrating linear tracing procedure with imprecise probabilities ⋮ Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes ⋮ Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining ⋮ Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty ⋮ Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games ⋮ Subjective reasoning -- solutions ⋮ Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games ⋮ Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment ⋮ Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures ⋮ Weak belief and permissibility ⋮ On non-monotonic strategic reasoning ⋮ An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness ⋮ Full farsighted rationality ⋮ Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games: a generalization of the theoretical comparison of hypergames and Bayesian games considering hierarchy of perceptions ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Coalitional strategic games ⋮ Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality ⋮ Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences ⋮ Coordination via delay: theory and experiment ⋮ Natural selection and social preferences ⋮ Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: theory and evidence ⋮ Mediated talk: an experiment ⋮ Asymmetric information and rationalizability ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory ⋮ Conservative belief and rationality ⋮ Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior ⋮ Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games ⋮ Belief in the opponents' future rationality ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes ⋮ Substantive assumptions in interaction: a logical perspective ⋮ Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games ⋮ Rationalizability in large games ⋮ What finite-additivity can add to decision theory ⋮ Studying strategies and types of players: experiments, logics and cognitive models ⋮ Value-rationalizability in auction bidding ⋮ Tit for tat: foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings ⋮ On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality ⋮ Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games ⋮ Iterated admissibility through forcing in strategic belief models ⋮ Shadow links ⋮ Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents ⋮ A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies ⋮ Iterated strict dominance in general games ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Collective, universal, and joint rationality ⋮ Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games ⋮ Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection ⋮ Extensive games with possibly unaware players ⋮ Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items ⋮ Strategic reasoning: building cognitive models from logical formulas ⋮ Random belief equilibrium in normal form games ⋮ On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability ⋮ The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games ⋮ Subjective rationalizability in hypergames ⋮ Coherent choice functions under uncertainty ⋮ Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies ⋮ Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games ⋮ A procedure for finding Nash equilibria in bi-matrix games ⋮ Rationalizable strategies in random games ⋮ Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games ⋮ Rationalizable foresight dynamics ⋮ \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information ⋮ Dominance rationality: a unified approach ⋮ Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Iterated dominance revisited ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ Updating confidence in beliefs ⋮ Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games ⋮ Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness ⋮ Unawareness of decision criteria in multicriteria games ⋮ Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the eductive viewpoint -- linear multivariate models ⋮ Simple unawareness in dynamic psychological games ⋮ Strong forward induction ⋮ Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness ⋮ Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning ⋮ The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games ⋮ A modal logic of epistemic games ⋮ A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information ⋮ Interim partially correlated rationalizability ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners ⋮ Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium
This page was built for publication: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
