Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3770317
DOI10.2307/1913602zbMath0632.90097OpenAlexW2100817802WikidataQ56803975 ScholiaQ56803975MaRDI QIDQ3770317
Paul D. Klemperer, Peter Cramton, Robert D. Gibbons
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913602
auctionspublic goodsincomplete informationfair divisionmechanism designex post efficiencybidding gameefficient tradinginterim-individually-rational trading mechanisms
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (97)
Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms ⋮ A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments ⋮ Efficient compromising ⋮ On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Efficient trading with restriction ⋮ Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects ⋮ Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition ⋮ Reorganizing a partnership efficiently ⋮ Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs ⋮ Auctions with financial externalities ⋮ Dissolving a partnership dynamically ⋮ Universal possibility and impossibility results ⋮ Market design with endogenous preferences ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments ⋮ Dissolving a partnership securely ⋮ A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism ⋮ A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share ⋮ (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Mechanism design for land acquisition ⋮ Balanced ranking mechanisms ⋮ Divide and compromise ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ The river sharing problem with incomplete information ⋮ Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ Optimal information structures in bilateral trade ⋮ When Walras meets Vickrey ⋮ Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions ⋮ Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers ⋮ Partial ownership and cross-border mergers ⋮ Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market ⋮ Trade of a common value good ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms ⋮ Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers ⋮ When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships ⋮ Shuttle diplomacy ⋮ No trade ⋮ Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently ⋮ Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms ⋮ On the dissolution of three-party partnerships via a buy-sell mechanism ⋮ Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem ⋮ Equitable rent division on a soft budget ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations. ⋮ Asymmetric partnerships ⋮ Partnership Dissolution: Information and Efficiency ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ A simple budget-balanced mechanism ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition ⋮ Investment incentives in bilateral trading ⋮ Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. ⋮ Long-Term Partnership for Achieving Efficient Capacity Allocation ⋮ Efficient allocation with continuous quantities ⋮ Partnership dissolution and proprietary information ⋮ Dissolving (in)effective partnerships ⋮ Optimal speculative trade among large traders ⋮ Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms ⋮ Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders ⋮ Competitive bargaining equilibrium ⋮ At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency ⋮ Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade ⋮ When queueing is better than push and shove ⋮ Claim games for estate division problems ⋮ Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders ⋮ Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions ⋮ Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: with experimental test ⋮ Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers ⋮ Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms ⋮ An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games ⋮ Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems ⋮ Efficient trading with nonlinear utility ⋮ Banning bidders from all-pay auctions ⋮ House allocation with transfers ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching ⋮ A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types ⋮ Pollution claim settlements under private information ⋮ Bargaining over bets ⋮ Countervailing incentives in agency problems ⋮ Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets ⋮ Bilateral trading with contingent contracts ⋮ Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game ⋮ Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability ⋮ Asymmetric price-benefits auctions ⋮ A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure ⋮ Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem. ⋮ Efficient dark markets ⋮ The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
This page was built for publication: Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
