Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
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Publication:3754461
DOI10.2307/1913604zbMath0617.90105OpenAlexW2119040993MaRDI QIDQ3754461
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-120531056
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