The stability of hedonic coalition structures

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0877zbMath1013.91011MaRDI QIDQ700112

Matthew O. Jackson, Anna Bogomolnaia

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/23625abec73bee89bee70c24331ac0d741973694

zbMATH Keywords

coalition; cooperative game; hedonic game; individual stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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