The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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Publication:3960418
DOI10.1287/MOOR.7.4.617zbMath0496.90008OpenAlexW2071667058MaRDI QIDQ3960418
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.4.617
matching procedurestrategic misrepresentationrevelation of preferencesstable outcomegame-theoretic aspects of matching problems
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