Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Hierarchical allocation
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Random assignments of bundles
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- A market design approach to job rotation
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Local vs. global strategy-proofness: a new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
- Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Matching with restricted trade
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
- A task-allocation problem
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- School choice: an experimental study
- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Efficient priority rules
- Making just school assignments
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- Menu mechanisms
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization
- Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
- The marriage problem with interdependent preferences
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proof coalition formation
- Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- House allocation with transfers
- Behavioral strong implementation
- New axioms for top trading cycles
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
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