Core in a simple coalition formation game

DOI10.1007/S003550000067zbMath1069.91504OpenAlexW2141263345MaRDI QIDQ2388792

Hideo Konishi, Tayfun Sönmez, Suryapratim Banerjee

Publication date: 20 September 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/42180

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

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