scientific article
Publication:3208356
zbMATH Open0417.90001MaRDI QIDQ3208356FDOQ3208356
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry Green
Publication date: 1979
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
game theoretic modelincentivesNash equilibriadominant strategyelementary expositionpublic decision-makinglarge economiesPareto optimal outcomesClark-Groves mechanismincentive compatibility requirementsmanipulation by coalitionssatisfactory mechanismstruthful strategies
Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
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- Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
- Destroy to save
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- Fair Groves mechanisms
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
- Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Mechanism design for policy routing
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
- Regulation of a risk averse firm
- Mixed bundling auctions
- Efficiency in partnerships
- Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
- Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
- A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- On planning procedures which are locally strategy proof
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
- The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- On the balancedness of multiple machine sequencing games
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
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- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
- Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
- Economic juries and public project provision
- Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- Concave utility on finite sets
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
- House allocation with transfers
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- On robust constitution design
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
- Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space
- Core-selecting package auctions
- A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
- Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
- Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
- Incentive-compatible interdomain routing
- A simple implementation of efficient allocations
- Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
- Class shares and economies of scope
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
- Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
- Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
- An optional permit system for global pollution control
- Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms
- Pivot mechanisms as a link between probability and preference revelation
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
- Efficiency and Budget Balance
- Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Collaboration in Large-Scale Transportation Networks
- Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division
- Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
- Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
- Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
- Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
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