Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4zbMath0481.90001OpenAlexW1969795839MaRDI QIDQ1162423

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumprivate informationnon-cooperative equilibriaquasi-equilibriagame designgeneral principal-agent problemincentive-compatible direct coordination mechanismsprivate decisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Linear programming (90C05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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