Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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Publication:1322449
DOI10.1007/BF01242849zbMath0804.90014MaRDI QIDQ1322449
Publication date: 5 May 1994
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Pareto optimalityShapley-Scarf housing marketindividual rationalitystrategy-proofnessmarkets with indivisibilitiesstrict core mechanism
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