Social Choice Theory

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_666zbMath1458.91079OpenAlexW3080348382MaRDI QIDQ5150296

Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 15 February 2021

Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_666

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationsliberalismstrategy-proofnessimpossibility theoremsArrow's impossibility theoremvoting methodsaggregation rulessingle peakednesssocial choice functionschaos theorems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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