A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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Publication:1283855
DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2469zbMath0916.90008OpenAlexW2044838899WikidataQ60174226 ScholiaQ60174226MaRDI QIDQ1283855
Publication date: 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4229bace400dba91de96724c9ac511597d94c5bb
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Cites Work
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